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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MARY JANE 0. KLOEPFER

'

Plaintiff and Appellant,
VS.

Case No. 11581
CONTINENTAL ASSFRANCE
CO~IPANY,

Def end ant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a civil action brought by Plaintiff as beneficiary under a life insurance policy on the life of her
deceased husband to recover the proceeds of the policy.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
rrhe Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary J udg-ment.
RF.LH~F

SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the Court's
Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
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directing that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant and seeks an Order of the Supreme Court directing entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff on her Motion
for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The deceased, Eldon J. Kloepfer, was an employee
of Kloepfer Construction Company, Inc., which employer held a group life policy. (Exhibit D attached to Defendant'a Answer).
On March 30, 1968, decedent made application for
insurance on his life under said Group Life Insurance Policy. (Exhibit C attached to Defendant's
Answer).
That on April 11, 1968, prior to decedent's death,
Defendant accepted said application and issued its Certificate of Insurance, post-dated, however, to May 1,
1968, and sent said Certificate of Insurance, along with
a cover letter dated April 11, 1968, to decedent. (Exhibit A and Exhibit B attached to Plaintiff's Complaint).
Plaintiff 1s the beneficiary named in said policy.
That with the letter and policy, Defendant mailed
to decedent a premium notice showing a due date of
May 1, 1968. (Part oi' Exhibit E attached to Requests
to Admit).
That on the night of April 11, 1968, the decedent
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was killP-d in an airplane accident.
That the cover letter of April 11, 1968, the Certificate of Policy and the Premium Notice were received by Plaintiff after the decedent's death. On May
7, 1968. she tendered the premium to Defendant (part
of Exhibit E attached to Request to Admit), which was
refused.
That Plaintiff, as benerfriary, filed a claim for the
proceeds of the policy on decedent's life, which claim
was turn<>d down. Defendant based its denial of coverabe on the grounds that the policy's effective date
was May 1, 1968, and that hence, there was no insurance in force on the date of death, April 11, 1968. This
lawsuit followed.
Concerning the effective date of individual policies issued under the Group Policy, Paragraph 2 (A)
on Page LP 53936 aG of the General Provisions of said
Group Policy states:
Each individual eligible for insurance hereundPr who makes written request to the Policyholder, on the Company's forms, to participate
in the insurance under this Policy, and make3 the
required pa.vment of premium, if any, shall become insured subject to the following conditions:
(A) Each such Individual must furnish, without expense to the Company, evidence of
insurabilitv satisfactory to it before he
maY beco~e insured. if such evidence is
submitted, and payment of the required
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premium made, if any, the Individual's
insurance shall become effective on the first
of the insurance nwnth coinciding with
or next succeeding the date the Company
determines the evidence to be satisfactory.
(Emphasis added).
ARGUMENT
Point I

The language in the Group Policy on the effective
date of an individital policy is ambiguous and should
be resolved against Defendant.
Plaintiff contends that the policy on decedent's life
was in full force and effect on the day of its issue,
to-wit: April 11, 1968, notwithstanding the post-dated
effective date arbitrarily inserted by Defendant, towit: May 1, 1968, ex parte, without the insured's consent or knowledge, and notwithstanding the non-payment of premium prior to said date.
The application (Exhibit C) provides that the insurance 1-lhall become effective only in accordance with
the provisions of the Group Policy (Exhibit D).
l~xhihit

D, the Group Policy, provides under General Provisions, Paragraph 2, Individuals Insured, Subparagraph (A) (Page L P 53936 aG):
''Each such individual must furnish, without
expense to the Company, evidence of insurability
satisfactory to it hefore he may become insured.
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If any, the Individual's insurance shall become
effective on the first day of the insurance month
coinciding with or next succeeding the date the
Company determines the evidence to be satisfactory." (~~mphasis supplied).

The term ''insurance month'' is not defined m
either the application or the Group Policy.
It :-eems logical to assume that the irnrnrance month
begins with the date the application is approved and
the poli<'.y issued.
This would be April 11, 1968, pnor to decedent's
death.
Also, it is possible that insurance month means
calendar month, althouri:h it would have heen easy for
the Defendant. in drafting the Group Policy, to say
so in plain and simple language, which would make the
policy effective on April 1, 1968, or May 1, 1968, as
the parties might determine by agreement.
Here, there was no agreement as to which of several dat1:>s would be acceptable only an ex parte arbitrary choice by the Defendant under the above quoted
ambiguous language.
Volume I of Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Section 10!\ page 145, after stating that the parties mav
. fix the date upon which a policy becomes effective, and that when a time is fixed by the parties, it
will usually be controlling, provides:
~
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"But where there is an ambiguity in the expression of the policy as to what date shall control, the courts are prone to construe such ambiguity against the insurer so as to allow a recoverv
under the contract.''
·
Plain6ff submits that there is such an ambiguity
in this policy, contained in Paragraph 2 of General Provisions set out in full above.
This Policy uses the term "insurance month.'·
As stated above, one interpretation of this would
be to 11se it as synonymous with "calendar month."
However, this must not be so, or the scrivener of the
policy (Appellant assumes this would be the Defendant) would have used the well established phrase of
''calendar month,'' which begins on the first day of the
month and terminates on the last day of the month.
Also, it ia logical to interpret this pl*se to mean
the month beginning with the day the policy is issued,
whether it he the 1lth day of the calendar month, the
fifth da~', or what have you, and ending on the day before the corresponding day the next calendar month.
If the interpretation that ''insurance month'' means
"calendar month," is followed, then it would seem only
common sem;e that tlil~ provisions under interpretation
should he further construed to mean that if the evidence of jnsurability is accepted prior to the middle
of the calendar month, the effective date of the
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poliey is the first day of that month, and if the acceptance i:> rna<le after the middle of the calendar month

'

the effective date is the first day of the succeeding calendar month. Otherwise, why would there be a reference to two dates?

Here, the acceptance was made on the 11th day of
April, and under thi:-; interpretation, the policy was
effectiYe April 1st, and the policy was in full force and
efff'rt on the day of the insured 'H death, to-wit: April
11, 1968
And, if the interpretation that ''insurance month"
means something other than calendar month is followed,
it would seem that when the application was accepted,
the premium paid (or waived), and the policy issued,
that the insuranre month would begin at that time, and
the insurance would be in force at that time, which in
this case would be April 11, 1968, the date the policy
was issued.
One point stands rlear, and that is that there is
ronsiderable ambiguity attendant to the choice of language used hy the insurer in attempting to spell out the
the effretive date.
It likewise seems clear that in fixing the effective

date as Mav 1, 1968, even though the acceptance was
made on April 11th and the policy actually issued that
date, the insurer acted arbitrarily and without the con-
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sent or even knowledge of the insured.
The holding in the case of DiEnes vs. Saf eoo Life
Company, 21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P(2) 468, is that no ambiguous statement is to be enforced against an insured.
In Christensen vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
21 Utah 2d 194, 443 P(2) 385, the Utah Supreme Court
ruled that any ambiguity in a policy would be uniformly
resolved strictly against the insurer and in favor of the
in.:;ured.
Under this law, the policy was in full force and
effect, :mbject to either payment or waiver of premium
(see Point II) at the time of decedent's death.

ARGFMENT
POINT II
Non-payment of premium prior to death did not
preclude the effecti 1;eness of the insurance contract.

A. W AIYER OF PREMIUM
In this case, the Defendant, as a free and voluntary act, issued the policy on April 11, 1968, prior to the
time tlH· first premium was paid.
It i:.; generally well accepted that an msurer may

waive its right to a premium. (Vol. 16 A, Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice. Section 9083 (1968): Loftis
va. Pacifir; Mutual Life Insurance Company of Califor-
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nw. (Utah) 38 U. 532, 114 Pac. 134.
And, as a rule, delivery of a policy of life insurance
without payment of premium constitutes a waiver of
a condition that the policy shall not be in force until
payment of the first premium. (Annotation, 118 A.L.R.
1072).
Here. there appears to he no question but that the
Policy was issued and delivered. (See Fjxhihit A, cover
lette1· dated April 11, 1968).
Nor does there appear to be any question concerning the authority of the person making delivery to do
so, delivery having been made by Charles 0. Finley
and Company, Inc. (see Exhibit A), who is named as
Admini~trator in said Policy. (See page LP 542096-4
of Exhibit B and Notice of Premium, being part of
F,xhibit E).
And, an examination of Exhibit A, the cover letter
of April l 1, 1968, deliverying the issued Policy, shows
no mention of payment of premium as a condition of
delivery, nor any mention of payment of premium at
all.
B. GRACE PERIOD
Without in any wa~' desiring to minimize her claim
of waiver of premium ahove asserted, but in addition
thereto, Plaintiff desires to point out to the Court the
Policy provisions on the grace period allowed for pay-
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ment of premiums.
Paragraph 13 of said general provisions of the
Group Policy (Exhibit D, Group Policy 1 page LP 53936
G-6 entitled ''Grace Period,'' provides:
"A grace period of thirty-one days, without
interest charge, shall be granted for the payment
of every premium, after the first, during which
period the insurance shall continue in force, ... ''
The effective date of the Policy is, and the payment of premiums commences on, the ''first of the insurance month." (Exhibit D, Group Policy paragraph
2A, page LP 53936 aG).
By the plain terms of paragraph 13, the grace period of "thirty-one days ... after the first" would leave
the policy in force on April 11, 1968, the day of death,
under either interpretation of the effective date of the
Policy, to-wit: April 1, 1968, or April 11, 1968.
Pnder the first interpretation, the grace period
would not expire until l\fa~v 2, 1968, and under the second
interpretation the grace period would not expire until
May 12, 1968.
In either event, it was still running on the date of
decedent's cleath. April 11, 1968.
CONCLUSION
A poHc~v on the life of decedent, issued by Defendant, was in full force and effect at the time of dece-
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dent's death. Plaintiff, as the beneficiary under said
policy, is entitled to judgment for all proceeds thereof as prayed for in her Complaint.
The District Court's Summary Judgment in favor
of Defendant should be reversed and judgment on the
Complaint entered for the Plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSON & HOGGAN

By
Charles P. Olson
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
56 West Center
Logan, Utah
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